This paper investigates the relationship between capital account openness and growth. Our empirical investigation of the effects of capital restrictions on growth provides evidence supporting capital account liberalization, especially for developed countries. We also show that capital restrictions are more likely to reduce the benefits of foreign direct investment on growth in developing countries. Estimation results for long-term capital flows demonstrate that countries with higher flows tend to grow faster, and these results challenge the belief that countries must have attained a threshold level of development or human capital to benefit from capital inflows.
Introduction
Considerable ambiguity exists in the literature investigating the relationship between capital account liberalization and economic growth. This ambiguity is especially pronounced regarding the growth effects of capital controls, in that there are neither theoretical models analyzing the effects of capital flow restrictions nor good measures of capital controls across countries for use in empirical analysis. These factors explain the diversity of opinions about capital restrictions. Accordingly, this paper studies the effects of capital controls on growth using a measure of restrictions on capital account payments. Our results provide evidence favoring capital account liberalization, especially for developed countries. Moreover, by using interaction terms, we also examine the joint effects of capital controls and long-term capital flows on growth.
Our results indicate that developing countries with capital controls are less likely to benefit from capital inflows, especially from foreign direct investment (FDI).
The extent of capital account openness across countries can be measured by long-term capital flows. The literature is relatively clear about the growth effects of capital flows. A large body of theoretical literature suggests that different types of capital flows have different effects on growth. Although short-term capital flows can hurt growth due to the extremely volatile nature of these flows, long-term capital flows increase growth through a number of channels including technology diffusion, human and physical capital accumulation, improved financial development, and enhancement of external sectors in the host countries. This study investigates the growth effects of long-term capital flows. Our empirical analysis show that FDI flows promote economic growth through a number of channels, as described above. However, the results do not provide any support for the hypothesis that host countries need to attain threshold levels of development or human capital to benefit from FDI. In addition to the channels discussed above, we further focus on the joint effects of FDI and international trade on growth, a channel that is largely ignored in cross-country growth studies. Our results support the hypothesis that capital flows and trade flows are substitutes. This substitute relationship is more evident for trade with developed countries than for trade with developing countries.
Furthermore, little attention has been paid to the growth effects of foreign portfolio flows, probably due to limited availability of data. We use three measures of portfolio flows -total foreign portfolio investment, foreign bond portfolio investment, and foreign equity portfolio investment (FPEI) -in cross-country growth regressions to assess the impact of each type of investment on growth. Of three, only FPEI has a significant, positive effect on growth. Further regression analysis indicates that equity flows are most likely to promote growth through stock market development, especially increasing stock market liquidity and physical capital accumulation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature investigating capital account liberalization by using capital flows and capital controls as measures of capital account liberalization. Section 3 describes a standard empirical growth model, and data definitions and sources. Section 4 reports the estimates of the economic effects of capital account restrictions and of foreign direct and portfolio investment flows on growth. Also in this section, we further address some potential problems of the cross-country growth framework. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Literature Review

Capital Account Restrictions
The theoretical literature investigating capital account liberalization suggests that there is no simple, general relationship between growth and either capital controls or capital flows. A number of scholars have argued that free capital mobility benefits national economies through several different channels. First, capital mobility may promote a more efficient allocation of resources, especially the allocation of capital, and also provides numerous tools for risk diversification. Second, free capital flows can enhance economic growth through financial development. In other words, countries that liberalize their capital accounts can achieve a higher level of financial development, leading to technological innovation and economic development through the provision of a variety of financial services. 1 A number of studies have established a positive link between financial development and growth (e.g., King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1996 and and Klein and Olivei, 1999) .
Liberalization of capital flows has preceded episodes of sizable capital flows to both developed and developing countries. A number of observers have argued that this phenomenon can transmit crises in financial and currency markets, potentially affecting the international financial system as a whole, as was the case for Mexico and East Asia in the 1990s. The spread of crises can be detrimental to the growth of developing nations.
Although the benefits of free trade have been thoroughly established, at least on theoretical grounds, the benefits of capital account convertibility have not been theoretically demonstrated. Some have argued that the benefits of free capital flows are not as obvious as the benefits of free trade, if there even are net benefits. For example, Bhagwati (1998, p. 7) states "the claims of enormous benefits from free capital mobility are not persuasive." Citing the East
Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, Rodrik (1998, p. 57) observes that "(w)e have no evidence that it [capital account liberalization] will solve any of our problems, and some reason to think that it may make them worse." Rodrik also claims that, given the fact that crises in financial and currency markets have not been the exception but rather a regular occurrence in almost every decade, extensive capital account openness might intensify the negative effects of crises in the world economies since countries are closely integrated into the global financial system through the liberalization of capital accounts. Consequently, opponents of capital account liberalization claim that the costs associated with free capital flows far outweigh the benefits. Stiglitz (2000) evaluates the arguments for capital account liberalization and lists major theoretical and empirical weaknesses. Boyd and Smith (1997) also show that under some restrictive assumptions, currently poor countries would be made permanently poor by opening to international financial markets. Opponents of capital account openness frequently suggest various forms of capital controls as a remedy for the negative effects of financial crises, even though many predicted that it is impossible to totally eliminate financial crises.
Although it is difficult to dispute the positive growth effects of long-term capital flows, there is widespread belief that controls on short-term capital flows are more likely to benefit countries receiving high volumes of short-term capital inflows (see, e.g., Bhagwati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Rodrik and Velasco, 1999; Adelman, 2000; and Stiglitz, 2000) . Rodrik and Velasco (2000, p. 61) argue "(t) here is a strong case for discouraging short-term inflows during the upswing in the lending cycle." Their point is that controls on short-term flows are most likely to reduce the effects of financial crises. In addition to limiting extremely volatile short-run capital flows, capital controls are intended to stabilize foreign exchange markets and help structural reform programs.
Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1994) discuss two other reasons for capital controls: retention of domestic savings and maintenance of the domestic tax base. Furthermore, Singh and Weisse (1998) argue that in order for a country to maximize the benefits of capital inflows, it is crucial to have appropriate and coordinated government policies, such as the encouragement of long-term capital inflows and dissuasion of short-term equity flows. Unlike its non-interventionist policy stance on capital flows, which is largely responsible for its economic problems during the late 1970s, Chile pursued interventionist policies towards capital inflows in the mid-1980s and experienced relatively higher growth longer than was the case for other Latin American countries.
Nevertheless, Krueger (1987) argues that highly expansionary domestic economic policies financed by capital inflows caused Mexico's debt crisis in late 1970s, rather than the sizable capital inflows themselves.
The natural question to ask at this juncture is whether capital controls prevent crises or at least minimize the adverse effects of crises. On the one hand, considering two types of capital controls, controls on capital outflows and on inflows, Edwards (1999) argues that controls on outflows have largely been ineffective. This failure is due to the incentives for evading capital controls and the fact that many channels exist to circumvent them. Although there have been several countries that controlled capital flows, the literature largely focused on the experience of
Chile. This is due to the fact that Chile has enjoyed the most economic success among the nations that have restricted capital flows. Edwards argues that the success of Chile's controls on capital inflows has often been overstated. He (1999, p. 83) concludes that Controls on capital inflows may sometimes be a partial stop-gap. However, the long-term solution for a nation concerned with its vulnerability to flows of international capital is for countries to pursue sound macroeconomic policies, to avoid overly rigid exchange rates, and to implement banking supervisory systems that reduce moral hazard and corruption.
Moreover, Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) argue that after the imposition of capital controls in September 1998, the Malaysian economy experienced a speedier recovery and smaller declines in employment and real wages compared to the experiences of countries following IMF programs.
On the other hand, there are some studies (Glick and Huchinson, 2000; and Leblang, 1997) claiming that capital controls actually heighten currency crisis risk due to the fact that controls may send a negative signal to currency and financial markets. However, Eichengreen (2001) argues that these studies have not paid enough attention on the direction of causality and also the fact that different types of controls may send different signals.
Consequently, many economists have expressed reservations about capital account liberalization. We believe that a lack of empirical studies, which can help settle the issue, at least on empirical grounds, has created skepticism regarding the liberalization of capital accounts. The lack of empirical studies in this area is largely due to data limitations. It is difficult to measure capital account restrictions and thus not many measures are available for empirical research.
Moreover, the available measures of capital controls have serious limitations in that they are mostly general and thus are not differentiated by the intensity of controls. allow an assessment of the differences in the intensity of these restrictions across countries.
Another disadvantage of this measure, as described by Tamirisa (1999, p. 79) , is that it does not explicitly consider "the supervision and enforcement of exchange and capital controls and hence reflect legal (de jure) rather than actual (de facto) incidence of controls." Rodrik (1998) Moreover, using the Quinn index, Edwards (2001) finds that capital account liberalization boosts growth in developed countries but slows it in developing countries.
In this study, we follow Rodrik (1998) (Feeney, 1994; and Devereux and Lee, 1999) . Goldberg and Klein (2001) review both sides of the debate and develop a theoretical model from which it is possible to obtain both results. Indeed, this issue will only be resolved through empirical investigation.
By the same token, in international economics more attention is paid to the relationship between international production and capital movements than to the relationship between international production and international trade. Production that is located in one country but controlled by a MNC based in another country is international production. International production has become an important part of world production in the post-war period, and since the 1960s its growth rate has been higher than that of trade and income. The World Investment
Report of UNCTAD (1997) reports that the growth of international production has been stimulated by ongoing liberalization of capital flows and this growth will likely be sustained well into the current century. International production is financed largely through the FDI of MNCs. Therefore, a large part of international trade is now controlled by MNCs. Depending on the definition of MNC-related trade, Hipple (1990) Cantwell (1994) lists three types of international production. First, resource-based or export-platform international production is production that promotes trade and does not replace it.
This type of production is consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade theory.
Secondly, local market-oriented or import-substituting international production has both tradecreating and trade-replacing effects. It is impossible to say a priori which of these will dominate.
This type of international production cannot be explained through an appeal to relative factor endowments. Nevertheless, it may be explained by technological differences across countries. It is also possible that this type of production results from high protection of imports in the host countries. Thus, MNCs can circumvent trade barriers in host countries by establishing production facilities in these countries. Consequently, this type of FDI inflow can result in increased protection through collaboration with indigenous firms. Finally, rationalized or internationally integrated international production has the most complex relationship of all with trade. It is trade creating for both the home and the host countries through the promotion of both the exports and the imports of these countries. The net trade effects are difficult to determine. However, even in the case of local market-oriented international production, Cantwell (1994) concludes that the empirical evidence suggests that, as a rule, the trade-creating effect dominates the tradereplacing effect. This means that the relationship between international trade and international production is a complementary one. Yet, this issue remains an open question that we address later.
Further, one of the most important country-specific determinants of FDI is the trade regime of the host country. For example, Bhagwati (1978) argues that open economies are more likely to attract FDI. Equally important, FDI is more likely to increase the growth of export-oriented countries than that of countries that promote import substitution. This is because open economies are more efficient and provide better investment and institutional environments, which in turn attract more FDI, and also benefit more from FDI. Therefore, export-led growth, resulting from export promotion policies, creates the link between trade regimes and growth in the presence of FDI (see also, Balasubramanyam et al., 1996; and De Mello, 1997) . This relationship suggests that FDI promotes economic development by increasing productivity growth and the exports of host countries, and as a result, has a significant impact on the volume of international trade of the host countries. Helleiner (1973) Numerous empirical studies have investigated the relationship between FDI and growth, as well as the effects of FDI on domestic investment and technological change in host countries.
Most of these studies, however, are case studies that focus on individual country or regional experiences with FDI. Some studies also examine specific industries within countries. De Mello (1997) surveys much of the FDI literature and concludes that the effects of FDI on growth are expected to be manifold. Most of the case studies report a significant, positive correlation between FDI and GDP growth. These studies are also very diverse in that they examine differing aspects of the relationship between FDI and growth. Accordingly, in these studies, FDI affects growth through different channels, such as technology diffusion, increases in the level of human capital and capital accumulation, and trade.
However, there are few cross-country studies investigating the growth effects of FDI.
Data limitations are the primary reason for the lack of cross-country studies. The few crosscountry studies to date (such as Balasubramanyam et al., 1996; Blomstrom et al., 1992; Borensztein et al., 1998; and Olofsdotter, 1998) have found FDI to be an important determinant of growth through a variety of channels. However, due to data limitations, the cross-country studies used shorter time spans and a smaller sample of countries than are used in this paper. For example, Borensztein et al. (1998) examine the growth effects of FDI flows to 69 developing countries from developed countries over the period . They concluded that FDI inflows are the major channel for technology diffusion to LDCs, and FDI inflows have increased the growth of LDCs through technology transfers, and have also increased domestic investment.
They also study the interrelationship between FDI, human capital, and growth, and find that there exists a threshold of human capital, above which FDI affects growth positively and vice versa.
However, given the fact that most FDI flows have occurred between developed countries, their results are incomplete because they use FDI flows to developing countries from developed countries. Although this is consistent with the hypothesis that only FDI flows from developed countries provide superior technology, this may not be appropriate for other hypotheses that they test, such as the interaction of FDI flows with openness and human capital. Similarly, Olofsdotter (1998) examine the growth effects of FDI using a 50-country panel for the period 1980-1990, and conclude that the accumulated stock of FDI has a positive impact on growth. The main channel by which FDI affects growth is technology transfer, through imitation of foreign technology. She also studies at the joint effects of FDI and openness, human capital, property rights, and bureaucratic quality of the host countries. While the joint effects of FDI with openness and human capital are not significant, the joint effects with property rights and bureaucratic quality are significant. Surprisingly, the relationship between FDI and trade in developing countries has not been subject to extensive empirical investigation even though there are many case studies and macro studies of developed countries that investigate the relationship between trade and FDI. The findings of these studies, as discussed in Fontagne (1999) , are that even though there is a complementary relationship between FDI and trade, this relationship is not constant, but an evolving one. Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) , tests whether export-promoting countries benefit more from FDI than do import-substituting countries, using a cross-section of 46 countries for the period 1970-1985. They divide countries according to their trade orientations using two different criteria. The first criterion is based on World Bank classifications, while the second one applies structural-stability analysis to import shares. They conclude that the results for both cases provide evidence that FDI provides greater benefits to export-promoting nations.
Here we do not categorize countries according to their trade orientations. We use two alternative approaches to examine the interrelationship between FDI, trade volumes, and growth. The second approach used in this paper is that interaction terms are introduced into the estimated model to determine the relationship between FDI and various trade measures. None of these interaction terms is statistically significant with the exception of US bilateral trade and trade with OECD countries. These two interaction terms are negative and statistically significant.
These results imply that trade with developed countries and FDI flows are substitutes but this relationship is not significant for trade with developing countries. The substitutability of FDI and trade with developed countries can be explained, as UNCTAD (1997) reports, by noting that FDI flows between developed countries are mostly intended to serve domestic markets in host countries, whereas FDI flows to developing countries are largely motivated by a desire to rationalize production or to establish export bases in those countries. Another possible explanation could be that a high degree of protection for certain industries in developed countries acts as an incentive for MNCs to invest in these countries, which in turn decreases overall trade volumes.
Furthermore, we examine whether countries with higher levels of human capital, institutional quality, and democracy are likely to receive more FDI inflows and further benefit from these flows. Our results provide no evidence that the joint effects of FDI with human capital measures and democracy measures are positive. These results are not inconsistent with previous empirical studies. Although some earlier studies (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996; Borensztein et al., 1998) suggest that the capability levels of countries are important if countries are to benefit from FDI, our results are consistent with the findings of those studies (e.g., Olofsdotter, 1998; and Pritchett, 2001 ) that contradict this hypothesis. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 1996) and UNCTAD (1997) have listed the following advantages of portfolio equity capital flows (FPEI) for the LDCs:
increased ability to support a country's external position, greater flexibility of equity flows as compared to debt flows, the relatively lower sensitivity of equity flows to interest rate shocks, and the resulting promotion of financial development through local capital-market development.
Further, since some forms of FPEI flows, such as venture capital funds, are similar to FDI, the positive growth effects of FDI may be partially applicable to FPEI. However, as UNCTAD (1997) notes, the volatile nature of FPEI compared to FDI may lead to financial instabilities in countries that receive a high level of portfolio flows. To investigate this issue we employ three measures of foreign portfolio investment to measures of capital account openness. Of these, FPEI is the only variable that has a positive, significant effect in the estimates. None of the interaction terms between trade indicators and FPEI is statistically different from zero. Accordingly, these results suggest that FPEI is likely to promote growth through channels other than trade, such as increasing the capital stock available to the domestic firms in the host countries and increasing financial deepness in host countries.
Model and Data
We use the following empirical framework to investigate long-run growth. In general form, this model can be characterized as 1970-1979, 1980-1989, and 1990-1997 . The system of equations is estimated using the seemingly unrelated regression technique (SUR) as used by Barro (1997) .
Empirical Results
Capital Account Openness and Growth
We begin by examining the estimated growth effects of capital controls, CAPITAL. In column 1 of Table 1 , a negative and marginally significant coefficient, -0.72 (1.49), for CAPITAL suggests a negative but weak association between capital controls and growth. To test whether capital account liberalization affects growth in advanced and developing countries similarly, we estimate the same specification for these two groups of countries. The estimated coefficient for developing countries reported in column 3 is negative and insignificant, -0.67 (0.96). The estimated coefficient for developing countries reported in column 4 is negative and statistically significant at the 10% confidence level, -0.82 (1.75). These results provide some evidence that capital account liberalization boosts growth in industrial nations but does not significantly affect growth in developing nations. However, the insignificant coefficient for developing countries may be due to the fact that there is very little variation in this variable, because almost every developing country restricts capital flows. The average value for CAPITAL for developing countries ranged from 0.89 to 0.92 during the three decades used in our sample. Consequently, our regression results for CAPITAL are similar to the existing literature.
Because of simultaneity concerns, the model is also estimated using the previous fiveyear average for CAPITAL. 6 The results reported in column 2 are that the estimated coefficient are identical to the results obtained using the full sample, and thus do not alter our conclusions.
As discussed above, there exists substantial theoretical and empirical evidence that restrictions on short-term capital flows can enhance growth. However, restrictions on flows of FDI or FPEI may hurt growth. The empirical evidence presented here and elsewhere clearly suggests a positive relationship between these capital flows and growth. To examine the combined effects of capital controls and long-term capital flows on growth, we use variables for the interaction of CAPITAL with FDI and FPEI inflows. In addition to the interaction terms, the individual variables are also included in every specification. As reported in columns 5 and 6 in Table 1 , while the interaction terms with FDI and FPEI both have negative estimated coefficients, they are not statistically significant at the conventional levels. However, in column 7, the estimate for developing countries has a significantly negative coefficient, -0.86 (2.17), for CAPITAL*FDI, suggesting that developing countries with capital controls are likely to benefit less from FDI and in turn grow at a slower rate. Therefore, capital controls can have a negative effect on growth by reducing the benefits of FDI inflows. As discussed above, the statistically insignificant coefficient for CAPITAL for developing countries is probably due to the fact that almost every developing country employs capital controls, while the statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term suggests that capital account liberalization can benefit developing countries. Overall our results are close to the findings of Quinn (1997) who reports a positive and robust relationship between capital account liberalization and growth for all countries. Nonetheless, our results for developed countries are less conclusive, possibly due to reverse causation.
Next, we investigate the growth effects of FDI and FPEI. These regression results are reported in Table 2 . The regression estimate in column 1 reports a significant, positive coefficient, 0.54 (6.92), for contemporaneous FDI. This result implies a strong, positive relationship between the level of FDI and growth. However, the possibility of reverse causation must be investigated. After all, in addition to the size of the domestic market, the state of a country's infrastructure, maintenance of the rule of law, political stability, and geographical location, the current rate of economic growth and also the growth potential of a host country are important determinants of FDI inflows. Thus, the estimated positive coefficient for FDI might be indicating that fast-growing countries are likely to receive more FDI than the slow-growing countries. To test this hypothesis, we reestimate equation 1 using FDI averages over the five previous years. These results are reported in column 2. The estimated coefficient, 0.38 (3.68), 9 for lagged FDI is positive and statistically significant even though the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is slightly lower than for the contemporaneous value of FDI. While it would be a mistake to ignore the possibility that the growth prospects of a country are important in determining FDI flows into a country, at the same time, underestimating the growth effects of FDI would be equally incorrect. The appropriate question is whether countries with higher levels of FDI would have achieved the same growth rates without FDI. We believe that our results support the hypothesis that countries with higher FDI inflows would have not grown at the same rate without these flows, and that these countries have grown more rapidly than countries with low levels of FDI. Another potential problem for the estimated model is the possibility that outliers might bias the estimates in either direction. To control for outliers, we exclude three countries (Guyana, Singapore, and Suriname) with extremely high or low FDI inflows in one or more decades. Estimating the same specification as in column 1 obtains a similar coefficient, 0.73 (6.46), for contemporaneous FDI. The estimated coefficient, 0.38 (2.87), for lagged FDI is also significantly positive. 10 Thus, the existence of outliers does not appear to affect our results.
Although many empirical studies find that there is a significant, positive relationship between FDI and growth in host countries, most of these studies conclude that in order for countries to benefit from FDI they must have attained threshold levels of development, human capital, technology, and openness (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996; De Mello, 1997; and Borensztein et al., 1998) . Consequently, to test whether FDI affects growth in developing and developed countries differently, we estimate the model for both groups of countries. The estimates are reported in columns 3 and 4 for developing and developed countries, respectively.
The regression results have significant, positive coefficients for FDI for both groups of countries.
Also, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is approximately equal to the estimated effect for the total sample, reported in column 1. These results imply that FDI has benefited developing countries as much as it has stimulated the growth of developed countries. Another factor reducing trade, which is directly related to the above, is that if there are certain kinds of trade barriers that prevent MNCs from serving those markets through exports, then they might choose to relocate their production location to countries with higher protection levels. Thus, shifting locations will eventually decrease exports from the FDI source country, and may decrease overall trade if foreign affiliates mostly rely on local inputs rather than importing them from home. For example, OECD, 1995, (p. 126) states that (M)any United States multinational firms claim that these United States-owned plants abroad were necessary in order to maintain or increase their foreign market share, and/or to overcome foreign market barriers, such as the rising discriminatory effects of the European Union's trade barriers.
The same source (p. 127) also concludes "(b) y 1991, United States parents appeared to be serving their foreign markets primarily through sales of their affiliates abroad rather than through exports from the United States." Thus, given that FDI inflows originating from the United States have been responsible for a quarter of all FDI outflows for the period examined, FDI outflows from the United States are also likely to reduce the U.S. bilateral trade with the recipient countries, which also suggests a substitute relationship between FDI outflows and trade with the United States.
Overall, our results suggest that FDI inflows and trade flows are close substitutes and that this relationship is more evident for developed countries. Thus, this substitute relationship between FDI and trade can explain the negative coefficients on the interaction variables for FDI and the two measures of trade with developed countries. Although FDI inflows exert positive effects on growth directly, their effects on growth are reduced by a greater degree of openness, which is especially true for developed countries. However, examining the estimated coefficients in columns in 5 and 6 for the individual variables and the interaction terms implies that the direct effects of FDI on growth are much larger than their indirect effects on growth through trade.
We have also investigated the interaction of FDI with a number of growth determinants.
First, we examine the joint effect of FDI with several measures of human capital. Based on previous studies, we expect that human capital measures interact positively with FDI. However, none of our estimates support the hypothesis of a positive interaction between FDI and human capital. On the contrary, almost all of the estimated coefficients have incorrect signs, and some are even significant. For example, while the interaction term between FDI and LIFE has a negative and insignificant coefficient, -1.21 (1.01), the interaction term between FDI and the average years of schooling in the total population has a negative and significant estimated coefficient, -0.085 (2.12). Thus, our results fail to provide evidence that countries with higher human capital levels tend to benefit more from FDI. On the one hand, these results can be explained by the fact that these measures are just proxies and may not measure the human capital levels of the countries correctly. On the other hand, as Pritchett (2001) argues, this can also be explained by the argument that the growth effects of education have been overstated.
After all, a number of studies (for example, Temple 1999) have concluded that human capital in the form education has no or a negative effect on growth.
Next, we examine the joint effects of FDI with several political and institutional measures.
Existing literature suggests that political stability, maintenance of rule of law (LAW), and the civil liberties (DEMOC) are expected to interact positively with FDI. Our results are mixed. The interaction terms with both WAR and REGIME have insignificant, negative coefficients. However, the estimated interaction term for FDI and DEMOC has a statistically significant, negative coefficient, -0.80 (2.61), as reported in column 7 of Table 2 . This suggests that higher levels of democracy are likely to reduce the growth effects of FDI inflows. At the same time, the interaction terms with LAW and its components all have positive but insignificant estimated coefficients.
Therefore, in addition to WAR and REGIME, these results provide little evidence to support the hypothesis that countries with greater adherence to the rule of law and political stability benefit more from FDI inflows. It is important to note that in most of these specifications, individual variables have significant coefficients with the expected signs, indicating that political stability, democracy, and rule of law are important determinants of growth. Third, the interaction terms with measures of infrastructure (TELPW and paved roads as percentage of all roads) and investment ratios all have positive coefficients but they are not statistically significant. Thus, our results fail to support the hypothesis that countries with better infrastructure are likely to attract more FDI or benefit more from the FDI inflows.
We also investigate whether FDI inflows have significant interactions with the black market premium (BMP) and the Sachs and Warner openness index (SWOPEN). 12 The estimated interaction term with the BMP has a significant, negative coefficient, -2.86 (3.00), implying that there are negative growth effects of FDI in combination with the BMP. Thus, considering the BMP either as a measure of distortions in the capital account of the balance of payments or simply a measure of "bad policies" does not alter our conclusion that the distortions of exchange rates tend to reduce the effects FDI inflows on growth. However, the estimated interaction term with SWOPEN has an incorrect sign but is insignificant, probably due to the fact that it is highly correlated with BMP. Hence, these results fail to support the hypothesis that open countries as measured by the SWOPEN variable are likely to benefit more from FDI inflows. Overall, our results are generally consistent with previous studies including Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) , Blomstrom et al. (1992) , Borensztein et al. (1998), and Olofsdotter (1998) . Nevertheless, our results differ in several respects from the findings of Borensztein et al. Although they report positive growth effects of FDI inflows, they also find that the interaction term with male secondary schooling as a measure of human capital has a statistically significant' positive coefficient, while the interaction term with BMP is not statistically significant. Thus, they conclude that countries must have a certain level of human capital to benefit from FDI. These differences could be partly explained by differences in the source of FDI data and their smaller sample size. The regression estimate reported in column 8 of Table 2 results of a survey of international emerging market equity fund managers conducted in 1997 that "the potential rate of economic growth was identified most frequently as being highly important in investment decisions." Accordingly, in column 9, we reestimate the specification in column 8 using FPEI flows over the previous five years as a partial remedy for the simultaneity problem.
The magnitude of the estimated coefficient, 8.28 (2.32), 14 for lagged FPEI is much larger and significant. Thus, the estimated coefficient for lagged FPEI is more likely to reflect the effect of FPEI on growth, rather than vice versa. The positive, significant estimated coefficients for FPEI flows indicate a strong, positive effect of FPEI on growth. Specifically, inclusion of FPEI in the regressions has increased the R-square for the 1990s to 0.40 from 0.19 for the same specification without FPEI. This is likely because the size of portfolio equity flows into developing countries has been considerably higher in the 1990s than it was in the previous decades.
Overall, our results indicate that countries receiving more FPEI inflows tend to grow faster. Thus, many authors recommended controls on capital flows due to their volatile nature, which have a tendency to intensify the crises and also transmit the crises to the global financial system.
On the other hand, UNIDO (1996) and UNCTAD ( This result supports the hypothesis that FPEI affects growth by increasing physical capital accumulation.
Sensitivity Analysis
The regressions results presented here may be subject to simultaneity problems. Thus, we test the sensitivity of our results for capital account openness measures by taking into account the possibility of endogeneity of our capital account variables. There are two common proposed remedies for this problem. The first remedy is to use lagged values of the exogenous variables.
The estimated results using this approach have been reported above. Second, the endogeneity problem can also be addressed appropriately by using instrumental variable techniques.
However, the major problem with this approach is that it is difficult to find good instruments that are correlated with the exogenous variables but are not correlated with the error terms. The results of the instrumental variable estimations are presented in Table 3 . The specifications that use contemporary values of the openness measures are estimated using three-stage least squares (3SLS). Note that the equation numbers in Tables 3 and 4 correspond to the specifications in Tables 1 and 2 . The 3SLS estimation results in Table 3 are very similar to those from the SUR estimations. However, now the estimated coefficient for CAPITAL for developed countries is insignificant with the same sign. Moreover, the interaction term between FDI and CAPITAL for all countries is negative and significant.
Next, to test the sensitivity of our results to different data sets, we reestimate the regressions in Tables 1 and 2 using the growth rates computed from the Summers and Heston data (GRSH) instead of the World Bank data. These results are reported in Table 4 . Comparing the estimates in Table 4 with previous results indicates that the estimated results using GRSH and GRWB are generally consistent. Note that the 3SLS estimation results for the specifications from Table 1 are extremely similar to those that use GRSH. Moreover, in Table 4 the interaction term between FDI and OECD has the reverse sign but is insignificant. Overall, we can conclude that our results do not appear to be extremely sensitive to either the data set used, the simultaneity problem, or the presence outliers, as discussed above.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the relationship between capital account liberalization and growth using two groups of capital account openness measures. 10 Estimates not reported in Table 2 are available from the authors.
11 Specifications for which the trade measures are not statistically significant are not reported in Table 2 .
12 Estimates not reported in Table 2 are available from the authors 13 Estimates not reported in Table 2 are available from the authors . (95) .26, (79) .37, (27) .41, (72) .27, (104) .28, (77) .36, (27) The system has 3 equations, where the dependent variables are the per capita growth rate during each decade. Each equation has a different constant term (not reported here). Other coefficients are restricted to be the same for all periods. * The column uses the five-year lagged value of the variable. d (dd) Only for developing (developed) countries. t-statistics are in parentheses. Table 1 
